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Abstract 
We examine the impact of football player migration to foreign leagues on their origin 
countries‟ international football performance. In our model, players acquire superior skills in 
foreign clubs, but continue to represent their origin country‟s national team, so emigration 
improves international football performance. To test this prediction, we have collected 
information on the club of employment of national team players for most countries in the world. 
We have constructed an original migration index, weighting each emigrant player by the quality 
of his club of employment. We find strong and robust support for the theoretical prediction that 
migration of players to foreign leagues improves their origin countries‟ international football 
performance. 
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1. Introduction  
It is well known today that international migration affects the level of human capital in 
origin countries in both positive and negative ways. In the short term, migration of skilled 
workers leads to a direct loss of human capital for the origin countries of migrants. In the long 
term, migration may induce human capital gains through several channels. The possibility of 
migration increases individual incentives to invest in human capital. Migrants‟ remittances may 
allow more families to afford such investments. Some migrants return to their origin countries 
after a while, with new skills acquired abroad. Depending on the circumstances, the net impact of 
skilled emigration on human capital may be either negative or positive, what is sometimes 
referred to as “brain drain” or “brain gain”.1 
A very interesting sector to study these effects is sports, where international migration is 
a particularly important phenomenon. The share of migrants in the main sports leagues in 
Europe and North America is very large compared to average economic sector standards, in 
particular for the top leagues. In some cases, European first division teams employed 100% 
migrant players. In contrast to the nuanced view of impact of the brain drain on sending 
countries expressed in the recent migration literature, the sports literature has typically been 
dominated by the negative view that “muscle drain” undermines the sporting capacity of 
developing countries
2
.  
In this paper we focus on football (soccer) player migration, which has grown 
exponentially over the past decade. Migration of football players accelerated with the 1995 
Bosman ruling, which removed restrictions on the number of players originating from European 
countries that could be recruited by European clubs, and which was extended to other origin 
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 See e.g. Adams (2003), Stark (2004), Özden and Schiff (2005), Boucher et al. (2005), Beine et al. (2008). 
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 See e.g. Swinnen and Vandemoortele (2009) for a review. 
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countries (and sports) by the Malaja, Kolpak and Simutenkov cases and the 2000 Cotonou 
agreement.
3
 Similarly to the familiar brain drain concerns, the globalization of the market for 
football players has been accused of causing a “muscle drain” for developing countries, 
depriving them of their most talented players for the benefit of professional leagues in rich 
countries.
4
 
Interestingly, a particularity of football player migration differentiates muscle drain from 
brain drain. Unlike most skilled migrants, who can only work in one country at a time, football 
players can play for their home country national team, while being hired by foreign country 
clubs. Thus, not only are national teams not deprived of their talents, but they may actually 
benefit from the additional skills acquired by their players training in top European leagues.  
Some analysts pointed out the concern that European clubs do not always allow their 
foreign players to participate in international competitions, like the Africa Cup of nations for 
example, which erodes the capacity of the home country to use its most talented athletes in 
international competition, leading to poor performances of developing countries in world sport 
events (Andreff, 2004, 2009). However, ad hoc observations suggest that developing countries 
have done better, not worse, since the start of substantial migration of their football players to 
rich country competitions. African teams have performed increasingly well in World Cups in the 
past decades. Despite the fact that many Ghanaian players are employed by European clubs, 
Ghana managed to reach the quarter final in the 2010 World Cup. This is an important 
achievement for an African country, with only two precedents: Cameroon in 1990 and Senegal in 
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 The Malaja, Kolpak and Simutenkov cases extend the Bosman jurisprudence to different sports and to citizens of 
Central Eastern European and CIS countries (Andreff, 2006). The 2000 Cotonou agreement, signed by the European 
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qualification of assimilated Europeans (Chaix, 2004). For discussions on the implications of the Bosman ruling, see 
e.g. Simmons (1997), Szymanski (1999), Antonioni and Cubbin (2000), Ericson (2000), Feess and Muelheusser 
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2002. This paper goes beyond anecdotal evidence by providing rigorous econometric tests of the 
impact of football player migration on the performance of sending countries‟ national teams. It 
contributes to two recent fields of the economics literature: the migration literature that analyses 
empirically the impact of skilled migration on the level of human capital in sending countries 
and the sports economics literature that analyses the determinants of international football 
performance. 
Recent datasets on migration rates by skill levels have allowed empirical analyzes of the 
impact of skilled migration on human capital in sending countries. Some papers focused on the 
positive incentive effect that the possibility of migration may have on human capital 
accumulation in sending countries (Beine et al., 2007, Beine et al., 2008 and Beine et al., 2009). 
Other papers analyzed skilled migrants‟ remittances, which may help overcome liquidity 
constraints for investing in human capital (Faini, 2007, and Niimi et al., 2008). The potentially 
positive impact of human capital acquired abroad and brought back in sending countries by 
temporary/return migrants is one of less well documented areas in this literature. Most existing 
studies attempt to provide estimates of the return rates of skilled migrants (for a review, see 
Docquier and Rapoport, 2010). The impact of the returnees‟ additional human capital is 
generally difficult to quantify. One particular sector in which such an econometric exercise is 
feasible is the migration of highly qualified sportsmen to foreign leagues. Institutional 
constraints specific to the sports sector (one needs to be a citizen in order to represent a country‟s 
national team) and data availability (the clubs of employment of players can be easily found on 
the internet) allow us to analyze the impact of migrants‟ skills acquired in foreign leagues on the 
international football performance of their origin country.  
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Empirical studies in sports economics have shown that international football performance 
is determined by economic, demographic, cultural, historical and climatic factors (Hoffmann et 
al., 2002; Houston and Wilson, 2002; Torgler, 2006; MacMillan and Smith, 2007). More recent 
empirical contributions have found new explanatory factors, such as linguistic heterogeneity 
(Yamamura, 2008), national institutions (Leeds and Leeds, 2009) and the level of health 
expenditures as a percentage of national income (Luiz and Fadal, 2010). To the best of our 
knowledge, five academic papers have analyzed, directly or indirectly, the effects of football 
players‟ migration to foreign leagues on national team performance.  
Milanovic (2005) is the first to consider this question. He focuses on the impact of player 
migration on inequality between teams, rather than on team performance. He develops a 
theoretical model predicting that the opening of football markets reduces inequality between 
national teams due to skills spillover between players. He provides descriptive statistics from the 
history of the World Cup suggesting that inequality between national teams, as measured by the 
average goal difference between winners and losers, gradually decreased between 1950 and 
2002. This innovative paper has two potential weaknesses: the theoretical model is based on 
some very specific assumptions on the distribution of skills between countries and no 
econometric analysis is provided. Gelade and Dobson (2007) are the first to provide an 
econometric analysis of the impact of migration on national team performance. They estimate the 
effect of an expatriate index, measured by the percentage of players training abroad, on the 
comparative strength of national football teams. While controlling for the size of the talent pool, 
football culture, economic resources and the climate, they find a positive and highly significant 
coefficient for their expatriate index. However, their results may be biased by an endogeneity 
problem. The authors proxy the talent pool by a logarithmic measure of the total number of 
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regular football players in the country. This variable is prone to reverse causality, since the 
performance of the national team may influence the popularity of the game, and therefore the 
number of regular players. Baur and Lehmann (2007) regress FIFA rankings on the number of 
imported and exported players. They find that national teams with a higher percentage of players 
under contract abroad perform better. However, the sample that is used for their study is rather 
limited: players are only considered imports or exports if they were in a national team that 
qualified for the 2006 World Cup in Germany. Moreover, the measures used for the market 
values of players have been criticized by Frick (2009). Using data on the participation of 
semifinals or finals in the World Cup and the European Championship from 1978 until 2006, 
Frick (2009) finds that the migration of players to the financially rewarding leagues in Western 
Europe does not improve national team performance. Another recent paper by Yamamura (2009) 
provides empirical evidence on the existence of football technology spillovers from developed to 
developing countries. The author considers the average world ranking points for the best leagues, 
i.e. Italy, England, Germany and Spain as a proxy for the most advanced technology level and 
finds that technology transfers have a positive impact on the performance of developing 
countries‟ national teams. However, this paper does not consider directly the role of migration in 
technology spillovers. Finally, none of these empirical studies draws upon an explicit theoretical 
framework.  
We analyze the impact of football players‟ migration on national team performance by 
addressing some of the shortcomings of previous studies. Contrarily to Milanovic (2005), we 
make no specific assumption on the distribution of players‟ skills among countries. Second, we 
test empirically the main prediction of the model, i.e. the existence of a positive but decreasing 
effect of migration on national team performance due to superior training acquired by migrating 
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players in foreign clubs. Third, in order to quantify the skills spillover effect of migrating 
players, we construct a weighted migration index that takes into account the strength of the 
foreign clubs to which players migrated. Our index is a more accurate measure of skill 
acquisitions through migrations than the percentage of migrant players used by Gelade and 
Dobson (2007) and Frick (2009), since the quality of training varies considerably among clubs 
and leagues. Fourth, we use population size instead of the number of regular players as a proxy 
for the talent pool, in order to overcome reverse causality. Fifth, we use a much larger sample 
than Baur and Lehmann (2007) by including migrating players from all national teams.  
Contrarily to Yamamura (2009), we explicitly analyze the effect of the migration channel 
on technology spillovers. Finally, we provide a theoretical framework in which the performance 
of the national team is explicitly computed as a function of players‟ migration rate. 
Our theoretical framework assumes that there are two countries in the world, one of 
which has bigger football markets. Players can choose between training in a home club and 
training in a foreign club. Migration to a foreign club entails a cost, but it increases player‟s 
productivity and revenue if training is superior in the foreign club. We show that only the most 
talented players will migrate if the revenue gain from immigration is proportional to innate 
talent. We compute the migration rate of players in the national team and we show that 
performance is an increasing and concave function of the migration rate.  
We test these predictions using cross country data on national team performance and the 
club of employment of national squad players. In line with the theoretical predictions, we find 
that our weighted migration index has a positive and significant impact on the performance of 
national squads. This result is very robust across different specifications. We also find evidence 
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for a diminishing impact of migrations as predicted by the theoretical model, although this result 
is less robust.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical 
framework. Section 3 presents the empirical specification, the data and the results. Section 4 
concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
Assume there are two countries in the world: home and foreign. Each country has a 
national football team with   players. Player            in the home national team has an 
innate talent   , and player            in the foreign national team has an innate talent   
 . 
Players are ranked by increasing talent, such that            and   
    
      
 . 
Let   ∑   
 
    be the total stock of talent of the home national team and  
  ∑   
  
    be the 
total stock of talent of the foreign national team.  
The talent of each player and the training that he gets in the club he is playing for 
determine his skills for football. We assume that the skills    of player   are given by the 
function:  
              (1) 
where    is the training level of player  .  
Players can choose to play for a foreign club, but they cannot play for the foreign national 
team.  
Without loss of generality, we assume that the market for football is bigger in the foreign 
country. Having access to bigger markets, foreign clubs earn higher revenues from each game 
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and thus have more resources to invest in infrastructure, coaches, medical care and other training 
facilities.
5
 Foreign country clubs therefore offer better training than home country clubs. 
For simplicity, we assume that players get a training level   if they play in a home 
country club and      if they play in a foreign country club.6  
Players‟ wages are an increasing function of their skills. We assume that a player with 
skills    earns    , with    . Players from the home national team earn more if they play for a 
foreign club, since        
   .  
In line with the international migrations literature, we suppose that migrating abroad 
entails a cost   for the players (Borjas, 1989). This cost includes moving expenditures, but also 
emotional and social costs of leaving one‟s home country, learning a new language, adapting to a 
new culture, etc.  
Player   will therefore migrate if 
       
     ,      (2) 
which is equivalent to 
     ̅      
    ⁄ .     (3) 
A player with a talent level equal to   ̅ is exactly indifferent between playing for a home club and 
migrating to a foreign club. Players with higher talent migrate to a foreign club and players with 
lower talent play for domestic clubs. 
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Condition (3) implies that the minimum talent level inducing emigration increases with 
the migration cost and decreases with the difference in the quality of training between foreign 
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 This assumption could be endogenized by solving the optimization problem of a club willing to maximize winning 
probability subject to the balanced budget constraint. 
6
 In reality, the quality of clubs in a country is obviously not homogenous. The parameters  and  can be 
interpreted as an average of the training level in home and foreign country clubs respectively. 
7
 The value of   ̅is defined as follows:  ̅    if   ̅<  ,  ̅    if   ̅ >   and  ̅    if      ̅<     for       . 
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and home clubs. It also implies that no foreign player is willing to work for a home club since 
that would imply bearing the migration cost and earning lower revenues. 
We can then define the football migration rate   as the share of national talent playing 
for a foreign club: 
  ∑   
 
   ̅  ∑   
 
   ⁄ .     (4) 
We can now relate the performance of the national team to migration. The performance 
of a team is given by its winning percentage. We follow Kesenne (2007) and define the winning 
percentage of a team by the following logit contest success function:  
         ⁄ ,      (5) 
where   is the probability that the home team wins a game against the foreign team,   ∑   
 
    
is the stock of skills of the home national team and    ∑   
  
    is the stock of skills of the 
foreign national team.  
As all players     ̅ from the home national team migrate to a foreign club, where they 
get a training equal to   , the winning percentage of the national team will be equal to: 
    ∑   
 ̅
     
 ∑   
 
   ̅     ∑   
 ̅
     
 ∑   
 
   ̅    
 ∑   
      ⁄    (6) 
We can express this winning percentage as a function of the football migration rate: 
  [           ] [                ]⁄     (7) 
Deriving   with respect to  gives: 
    ⁄                                ⁄   .  (8) 
It follows from (8) that migration has a positive effect on national team performance.  
This positive effect depends on the assumption that migrating players obtain superior 
training (    ). This is a reasonable assumption, if one admits that players‟ wages are 
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proportional to their skills and that migration is costly. Indeed, no player would be willing to 
bear the migration cost if foreign club wages were inferior to domestic club wages. 
We can check that performance is a concave function of the migration rate:  
      ⁄                                    ⁄   .  (9) 
Concavity is due to the shape of the contest success function (5). Different signs for the 
second order derivative could be obtained with a more general contest success function.
8
   
Our theoretical model predicts that football players‟ migration rate to foreign clubs has a 
positive but diminishing influence on the performance of their home national teams. The 
following section provides empirical evidence supporting this argument. 
 
3. Empirical Framework 
We test the predictions of the model using cross country data on FIFA countries‟ national 
team performance and the club of employment of their players. The following sections provide 
the definitions of the variables used, the data sources, the estimation techniques, the regression 
results and some extensions and robustness checks.  
 
3.1. Variables and Data 
Following the football economics literature, we measure national team performance by 
the number of FIFA points each national team has obtained during games played against other 
national teams. The number of points per game depend on the outcome of the game, on the 
importance of the game, on the strength of the opponent and on the strength of the regional 
confederation. The performance of a team is computed as the sum of current year performance 
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 For example, the contest success function  used by Dietl et al. (2008) could give either a 
concave or a convex performance function, depending on the value of . 
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and a three-year weighted average of previous annual performances, with a gradual decline in 
importance of results. Table 1 gives the twenty national teams with the highest number of FIFA 
points in February 2010.  
In order to quantify the effect of migrating players‟ skill acquisitions, we construct a 
migration index that takes into account the strength of the league and the division of the club to 
which national team players migrated.  
As mentioned in the introduction, the literature has used the percentage of migrating 
players as a measure of the migration rate (Gelade and Dobson, 2007; Frick, 2009). However, 
this index does not take into account the fact that some players migrate to average foreign 
leagues, where the quality of training is only slightly better than what they could obtain at home, 
while other players migrate to top European leagues, where the quality of training is the best in 
the world. A player migrating to a club in a higher quality league will acquire better skills, so he 
should get a higher weight in the migration index.  
We collected data on the club of employment for the players of all national teams. For 
confederations organizing confederation championships, we use the squad compositions during 
those championships.
9
 For AFC countries we use the 2007 AFC Asian Cup squads, for CAF 
countries, we use the 2008 Africa Cup of Nations squads, for CONCACAF countries we use the 
2007 CONCACAF Gold Cup squads, for CONMEBOL countries we use the 2007 Copa 
América squads and for UEFA countries we use the UEFA Euro 2008 squads. The OFC Nations 
Cup is organized for OFC countries, but squad compositions of this championship were not 
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 There are six football confederations; the Asian Football Confederation (AFC), the Confédération Africaine de 
Football (CAF), the Confederation of North Central American and Carribean Association Football (CONCACAF), 
the Confederación Sudamericana de Fútbol (CONMEBOL), the Oceania Football Confederation (OFC) and the 
Union des Associations Européennes de Football (UEFA), currently consisting of respectively 46, 52, 35, 10, 11 and 
53 football nations.   
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available. Data on the national squads for non participating countries were taken from 
http://www.national-football-teams.com/v2/national.php. 
Note that we use 2010 data for team performance and 2007 or 2008 data for national 
squad composition. The reason for using lagged data for the squad composition is that players 
who have emigrated only recently are unlikely to contribute with newly acquired skills to the 
performance of their national squads, since acquiring skills is a process that takes time (FIFA, 
2006).  
We attach the following migration index to each national team: 
     
 
 
∑   ∑
 
 
     ,     (10) 
where   is the total number of players in the national squad,     is the number of players that 
migrated towards a division   club in UEFA league  , and    is the relative UEFA ranking of 
league  . This index assigns a higher weight to players migrating to stronger leagues and to 
higher divisions.  
Note that only national team players migrating to UEFA leagues are computed in our 
migration index. This is not an important restriction, given that in the African continent, which is 
the confederation with the highest number of migrating players towards another confederation 
than UEFA, only around 30 out of almost 500 migrating players were not playing in UEFA 
countries.  
The UEFA ranking of league    is the ranking associated with the sum of the five UEFA 
coefficients of the last five years. The UEFA coefficients are calculated based on the 
performance of club teams in the main European club competitions, the Champions League and 
the Europa League. In general, each participating team gets two points for a win, one point for a 
draw and some bonus points for proceeding further in the tournament. The UEFA coefficient 
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assigned to a country is the sum of points obtained by all the participating teams from that 
country divided by the number of those teams. The data is taken from 
http://www.xs4all.nl/~kassiesa/bert/uefa. 
In order to get rid of the inverse relationship between UEFA ranking and performance, 
we assign the following relative ranking to league   (Barajas et al., 2005): 
                         ⁄       (11) 
where       is the number of UEFA countries and         is the position of league   in the 
UEFA ranking.  
Our migration index takes values between 0 (no player was playing in a foreign UEFA 
league) and 1 (all players were playing in highest ranked foreign UEFA league). Table 2 
provides the twenty national squads with the highest migration index. Table 3 provides the 
twenty national squads with a zero migration index in our sample, with the exclusion of the 
Oceanic and Asian confederation countries.
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We control for a number of explanatory variables, in line with the literature on 
international football performance. Following Hoffmann et al. (2002), Houston and Wilson 
(2002) and Torgler (2006), we include GDP per capita and its quadratic form as control 
variables.
11
 Individuals living in wealthier countries are more likely to participate in leisure 
activities and subsequently in competitive sports. Furthermore, wealthier countries have more 
resources to spend on health care, training facilities and other productivity enhancing inputs. One 
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 Only the Oceanic confederation squad of New Zealand and the Asian confederation squads of Afghanistan, 
Australia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Korea DPR, Korea Republic, Lebanon, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Syria, 
Thailand, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan had players migrating to UEFA leagues in our sample. 
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 Since football is an inexpensive sport compared to other sports, poorer people might be overinvesting in it. 
Moreover, if income increases, not only other outdoor sports will act as substitutes for football but also indoor 
activities such as video and DVD games.   
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expects a positive relationship between income and international football performance. Data on 
GDP per capita is taken from the International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook 2009. 
We control for countries‟ population size and its quadratic term, as a proxy for the pool 
of talent. We use population data for the year 2009, from the CIA World Fact Book.  
Countries with a longer football history are likely to perform better in international 
competitions. In line with the existing literature, we use the year of foundation of the national 
football association to measure football history.
12
 This data has also been gathered from 
http://www.national-football-teams.com/v2/national.php. 
Next, a temperature variable is introduced to take into account the effect of climate on 
football performance. Following earlier contributions (Hoffmann et al., 2002; Macmillan and 
Smith, 2007), we measure temperature by the squared deviation of average annual temperatures 
from 14° C in the capital city. The coefficient of this variable is expected to be negative. 
Finally, we control for historical performance in international football competitions. 
Following previous literature (Houston and Wilson, 2002; Yamamura, 2008, 2009), we use the 
number of World Cup appearances as measure of historical performance.
13
  
Our dataset includes 190 countries.
14
 Table 4 provides the descriptive statistics. 
 
                                                          
12
 Since some former members of socialist political entities like the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia 
have relatively recent foundations, but presumably a football tradition dating back to the affiliation with those 
former entitities, we substituted the year of foundation of the national football association by the year of absorption 
into the respective entity for those countries for which foundation was only after the dissolution of the large entity 
and if a national football association of this larger entity had been founded before. A similar approach is undertaken 
in Gelade and Dobson (2007), while others (Macmillan and Smith, 2007; Leeds and Leeds, 2009) try to overcome 
this problem by including dummies for former republic or communist members. 
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 We do not include 2006 and 2010 World Cup appearances in order to avoid endogeneity. 
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 Significant outlier behavior was detected for the effect of population size for China and India and for the effect of 
GDP per capita for Liechtenstein, Qatar, Bermuda and Luxembourg, so these countries were excluded from the 
regressions. No data on GDP per capita was available for Montserrat and Tahiti and data on national squad 
composition was insufficient for the Central African Republic, Eritrea, Papua New Guinea and British Virgin 
Islands, so these countries are also excluded from the regressions. Moreover, we exclude the strongest European 
leagues England, Spain, Italy, Germany and France (Big Five leagues) since the migration index for these countries 
does not measure skill acquisition effects. 
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3.2. Empirical Specification 
We estimate the following equation: 
                           
               
               
          
                                 (12) 
where         is the number of FIFA points for country  ,      is the migration index,      is 
GDP per capita,      is the population size,       is the temperature variable,       is football 
history,       is historical performance and    is an error term. 
We include both a linear and a quadratic form of the migration index in order to test for 
decreasing returns to migrations, as predicted by the theoretical model. 
This equation is estimated using ordinary least squares. The results are discussed in the 
following sections.  
  
3.3. Regression Results 
Table 5 reports estimation results for different specifications based on model (12). The 
unconditional specification in column (1) yields statistically significant migration coefficients for 
both the linear and the quadratic term. The positive sign for the linear term and the negative sign 
for the quadratic term are consistent with our hypothesis of decreasing returns to migration.  
In columns (2)-(6) we report regression results including the control variables described 
in section 3.1. In columns (2) and (3), we control for income per capita and population size. In 
line with previous studies, we find positive and significant coefficients for these two variables 
and negative and significant coefficients for their squared terms. Controlling for these two 
variables increases the significance of the quadratic migration term. Regressions (4), (5) and (6) 
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respectively add football history, temperature and historical performance as control variables. 
The signs and significance of these coefficients also confirm findings of previous studies. 
These empirical findings support the theoretical prediction of a positive effect of 
migration on international football performance. The coefficient of the migration index is 
positive and significant at the 1% level in all specifications. We also find support for the 
theoretical prediction of decreasing returns to migration. The coefficient of the squared migration 
index is negative and significant in all specifications, except for column (5). 
The final specification in column (6) suggests that holding other factors constant, a 1 
percentage point increase in the migration index raises FIFA points on average by 7.725 points 
for a country with an average migration level. The population of a typical country should 
increase with around 2.979 million inhabitants to generate approximately the same result ceteris 
paribus. More specifically, our estimations suggest that a developing country like Ghana, with a 
migration index equal to 0.637 (see Table 1), can increase its FIFA points by 32.226 points if its 
index increases by 10 percentage points. This could be obtained if, for example, three additional 
players of the Ghanaian national team migrated to a second rated UEFA league like Belgium.  
 
3.4. Extensions and Robustness Checks 
In this section, we consider extensions and robustness checks of our basic model. 
Our first robustness check is the use of the FIFA ranking as an alternative measure of 
international football performance. Note that the use of the ranking instead of the points leads to 
a loss of information on the variation in performance between nations.  
We estimate the following equation: 
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                   .              (13) 
Since ranking is a count variable, the appropriate estimation technique for this equation is a 
Poisson regression. However, due to excess dispersion of the rank variable, we estimate (13) 
using negative binomial regression. 
The results of this regression are given in Table 6. The positive effect of migration on 
national team performance is confirmed in all specifications (1)-(6). The prediction of decreasing 
returns to migration is not confirmed.  
The estimated migration coefficient drops significantly when we control for historical 
performance in column (6). This can be explained by the fact that the migration index may be 
correlated to historical performance. Countries that previously participated in the World Cup 
may attract more attention from foreign talent scouts and their players could more likely obtain 
contracts in foreign clubs.  
Including confederation dummies to models (12) and (13) and including the outliers in 
the sample does not change the results, nor the explanatory power of the regressions.
15
 
Our second robustness check aims at insuring that the estimated effect of migration on 
international football performance is driven by countries with small football markets, as 
predicted by the theoretical model. We address this issue in two ways. First, we include an 
interaction term between a dummy variable for UEFA countries and the migration index. We 
expect this interaction term to be negative since migration should be more valuable for 
confederations with smaller football markets. Second, we exclude UEFA countries from our 
sample. 
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Regression results including the interaction term between the UEFA dummy and the 
migration index are presented in Table 7. The linear migration variable is significant at the 1% 
level in both columns (1) and (2), while the quadratic migration variable is only significant in 
column (1), when performance is measured by the number of FIFA points. The negative and 
significant estimated coefficients of the interaction term indicate that migration towards UEFA 
leagues is more valuable for non-UEFA countries. These additional results are broadly in line 
with our theoretical framework. 
The results excluding UEFA countries are reported in Table 8. The coefficient of the 
migration index remains positive and significant at the 1% level, but the squared migration index 
loses its significance. More importantly, the coefficient of the migration index is higher than in 
the estimations using the whole sample (column (6) of Tables 5 and 6). This result is also 
consistent with the theoretical prediction that the skill acquisition effect should be more 
important for countries with smaller football markets. 
A third robustness check deals with the countries in the sample that have a zero migration 
index (see above). Since these countries are numerous, we should check whether they drive our 
results. The estimation results excluding those countries are shown in Table 9. The positive 
effect of migration on national team performance is again confirmed in columns (1) and (2). As 
expected, the estimated coefficients of the linear migration term decrease in magnitude since 
countries with low migration and bad national team performance are excluded.  
A final robustness check deals with the players that had once migrated to a UEFA league, 
but returned to their home leagues in 2007 or 2008. These players acquired skills during their 
UEFA experience, but are not included in our migration index. Including these earlier migration 
patterns in the migration index should increase the value of its estimated coefficient. Table 10 
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reports the regression results when the migration index includes returned players. In line with the 
expectations, the migration coefficient is higher. 
A final issue one can be concerned about is the endogeneity of our migration index. If a 
country has more talented players, these players will be more able to migrate to strong leagues. 
Consequently, this country will have a higher migration index, but also a better performing 
national team. As we cannot directly control for players‟ talent, there could be an omitted 
variable problem that could bias upwards the coefficient of our migration index. However, we 
think that population size and football culture, which we control for, are a fair proxy for a 
country‟s pool of football talent. Moreover, the fact that a player currently plays in the highly 
ranked UEFA league captures the experience effect of playing firstly in lower European leagues, 
since most players do not migrate directly from their home domestic league to the strongest 
European leagues. In the sports literature, there are numerous articles emphasizing that lower 
rated European leagues acts as “nursery hubs” (Andreff, 2009) or as “transition countries for 
potential top players” (Dejonghe, 2001). Hence, if the quality of the league is also a proxy for the 
time that the player has spent training in particular European leagues, then a high migration 
index signals a longer football experience acquired abroad. 
Another potential source of endogeneity is the possibility that well managed national 
football federations are more likely to obtain good results for the national team, but also to 
promote the migration of players. If this is the case, our estimations could be biased by an 
omitted variable problem. To investigate this potential endogeneity problem, we compare 2010 
data, when restrictions on football player migrations were very low, with 1994 data, when 
restrictions on football player migrations were very high. We restrict the sample to African 
countries, in order to focus on small football markets.  
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We estimate the following equation
16
:  
                                                                              
                           (14) 
Equation (14) is estimated using ordinary least squares.  
Table 11 reports the results. In all columns (1)-(4), migration has a positive and 
significant influence on the evolution of national team performance between 1994 and 2010. In 
line with Ruiz and Fadal (2010), we find that the size of the economy is the only other significant 
driver of African football performance. The final specification (4) suggests that a one percentage 
point increase in the migration index increases the evolution of the FIFA ranking between 1994 
and 2010 with 0.285 percentage points ceteris paribus. 
To sum up, we have found strong and robust empirical support for the theoretical 
prediction that football players‟ migration improves the performance of national teams for 
countries with small football markets. We have found some support, although less robust, for the 
prediction of decreasing returns to migrations on national team performance.  
                                                          
16
 The temperature variable is excluded from this regression since we focus on the African continent and the World 
Cup appearances variable is excluded since differences in World Cup appearances cancel out. 
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4. Conclusion 
We investigated the effect of outward migration of football players on the performance of 
their home countries‟ national teams. We built a simple theoretical framework predicting a 
positive effect of players‟ migration rate on national team performance. This positive effect is 
due to the superior skills that migrating players acquire in foreign clubs and that they take back 
with them when representing their national team. We used cross country data on national team 
performance and on the club of employment of national team players to test this prediction. We 
quantified the effect of skill acquisitions abroad by computing, for each national team,  a 
migration index that weights each migrant player with the strength of the foreign league where 
he is training. 
After controlling for wealth, population, climate, football history and historical 
performance, we find significant and robust support for the prediction of a positive effect of 
migration on international football performance. This evidence suggests that while developing 
countries‟ football clubs may experience a “muscle drain”, their national teams experience a 
“muscle gain” at the same time. 
These optimistic results on the impact of migration on international football performance 
through skill spillovers cannot be easily generalized to other sectors than sports, where 
temporary return of migrants is less systematic. However, the experience of football players 
could serve as an example for other professionals willing to do something for their origin 
countries. Policy makers willing to increase the development impact of international migrations 
could try to design programs that facilitate temporary return of skilled professionals who are 
willing to work in their origin country for short periods of time. Some projects of this type have 
already been initiated. For example, the International Organization for Migration has recently 
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launched a program that finances short term working visits of expatriated Moldovan scientists to 
an academic institution in their origin country. The aim of these visits is to facilitate skill-
spillovers and scientific collaboration between Moldovan and foreign academic institutions. 
Analyzing the impact temporary return of migrants in other sectors than sports could be an 
interesting direction for future research. 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Twenty national football teams with highest FIFA points in February 2010 
Country Points 
Spain 1627 
Brazil 1568 
Netherlands 1288 
Italy 
Portugal 
1209 
1176 
Germany 1173 
France 1117 
Argentina 
England 
1082 
1076 
Egypt 
Croatia 
Greece 
Russia 
USA 
Nigeria 
Chile 
Mexico 
Switzerland 
Serbia 
Cameroon 
1069 
1053 
1030 
1026 
963 
956 
955 
947 
924 
916 
914 
Source: FIFA. 
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Table 2: Twenty national football teams with highest migration index  
Country                   Migration index 
Côte d’Ivoire 0.922 
Republic of Ireland 0.833 
Czech Republic 0.828 
Senegal 0.823 
Brazil 0.809 
Nigeria 0.803 
Cameroon 0.75 
Croatia 0.726 
Switzerland 0.687 
Sweden 
Australia 
Ghana 
Argentina 
Northern Ireland 
Serbia 
Uruguay 
Netherlands 
Mali 
Montenegro 
Slovakia 
0.661 
0.657 
0.637 
0.618 
0.617 
0.606 
0.599 
0.589 
0.588 
0.587 
0.585 
 
Table 3: Twenty national football teams with zero migration index, excluding Oceanic and 
Asian confederation countries 
Country                   Migration index 
Botswana 
Comoros 
0 
0 
Ethiopia 
Lesotho 
Seychelles 
Sudan 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Aruba 
Belize 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Cuba 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Nicaragua 
Puerto Rico 
St. Lucia 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
Suriname 
Turks and Caicos Islands 
US Virgin Islands 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Notes: (i) See text for Oceanic and Asian confederation. 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics  
Variables Mean Max. Min. Std. Dev. 
FIFA points 378.921 1568 0 320.993 
Migration index 0.204 0.922 0 0.237 
GDP per capita (in 1,000$)  13.285 53.269 0.009 13.249 
Population (in 1,000,000 inhabitants) 20.818 307.212 0.012 41.577 
Football history 1939.326 2002 1873 27.294 
Temperature 83.821 256 0 68.641 
Historical performance 1.432 17 0 2.935 
Notes: (i) See text for variables description. 
 
Table 5: Determinants of international football performance measured by FIFA points 
 Dependent  
variable 
FIFA points 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 
 
Migration 
 
Migration² 
 
GDP per capita 
 
(GDP per capita)² 
 
Population 
 
Population² 
 
Football history 
 
Temperature 
 
Historical performance 
 
Observations 
Adjusted R² 
 159.855 
(0.000) 
1390.138 
(0.000) 
-660.940 
(0.069) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
190 
0.51 
91 
(0.000) 
1323.701 
(0.000) 
-606.356 
(0.086) 
10.875 
(0.008) 
-0.192 
(0.046) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
190 
0.528 
-7.63 
(0.782) 
1317.621 
(0.000) 
-663.132 
(0.017) 
14.267 
(0.000) 
-0.234 
(0.008) 
5.185 
(0.000) 
-0.015 
(0.001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
190 
0.627 
4296.92 
(0.000) 
1155.419 
(0.000) 
-508.075 
(0.055) 
10.599 
(0.003) 
-0.181 
(0.025) 
4.573 
(0.000) 
-0.013 
(0.002) 
-2.191 
(0.000) 
 
 
 
 
190 
0.652 
3813.691 
(0.001) 
1032.881 
(0.000) 
-377.991 
(0.163) 
9.749 
(0.006) 
-0.167 
(0.04) 
4.284 
(0.000) 
-0.012 
(0.003) 
-1.905 
(0.001) 
-0.566 
(0.006) 
 
 
190 
0.662 
2358.646 
(0.019) 
962.6 
(0.000) 
-466.043 
(0.081) 
6.55 
(0.054) 
-0.111 
(0.146) 
3.437 
(0.000) 
-0.011 
(0.005) 
-1.152 
(0.026) 
-0.42 
(0.028) 
29.399 
(0.000) 
190 
0.7 
Notes: (i) In parentheses p-values based on standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. (ii) Estimation method: ordinary least squares. (iii) 
Significant variables of interest in bold. 
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Table 6: Determinants of international football performance measured by FIFA ranking 
 Dependent  
variable 
FIFA ranking 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 
 
Migration 
 
Migration² 
 
GDP per capita 
 
(GDP per capita)² 
 
Population 
 
Population² 
 
Football history 
 
Temperature 
 
Historical performance 
 
Observations 
Adjusted R² 
 4.981 
(0.000) 
-2.568 
(0.000) 
0.788 
(0.371) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
190 
0.509 
5.127 
(0.000) 
-2.518 
(0.000) 
0.756 
(0.36) 
-0.022 
(0.012) 
0.000 
(0.075) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
190 
0.502 
5.336 
(0.000) 
-2.529 
(0.000) 
0.803 
(0.266) 
-0.032 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
-0.011 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.05) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
190 
0.563 
-3.889 
(0.098) 
-2.197 
(0.000) 
0.495 
(0.466) 
-0.023 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.036) 
-0.009 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.09) 
0.005 
(0.000) 
 
 
 
 
190 
0.612 
-2.879 
(0.244) 
-1.956 
(0.000) 
0.261 
(0.702) 
-0.021 
(0.008) 
0.000 
(0.05) 
-0.008 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.026) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
 
 
190 
0.624 
0.27 
(0.901) 
-1.696 
(0.000) 
0.398 
(0.538) 
-0.013 
(0.081) 
0.000 
(0.165) 
-0.007 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.102) 
0.002 
(0.028) 
0.001 
(0.024) 
-0.081 
(0.000) 
190 
0.682 
Notes: (i) In parentheses p-values based on standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. (ii) Estimation method: negative binomial. (iii) 
Significant variables of interest in bold. 
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Table 7: Determinants of international football performance, including an interaction term 
between UEFA countries and the migration index 
 
Variables 
Dependent  
variable 
FIFA points 
(1) 
FIFA ranking 
(2) 
Constant 
 
Migration 
 
Migration² 
 
GDP per capita 
 
(GDP per capita)² 
 
Population 
 
Population² 
 
Football history 
 
Temperature 
 
Historical performance 
 
UEFA*migration 
 
Observations 
Adjusted R² 
 3052.091 
(0.003) 
1048.283 
(0.000) 
-450.156 
(0.076) 
8.421 
(0.015) 
-0.139 
(0.075) 
3.135 
(0.001) 
-0.01 
(0.004) 
-1.508 
(0.004) 
-0.53 
(0.006) 
28.467 
(0.000) 
-222.176 
(0.029) 
190 
0.722 
-1.583 
(0.451) 
-1.963 
(0.000) 
0.369 
(0.578) 
-0.018 
(0.014) 
0.000 
(0.062) 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
0.000 
(0.085) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.082 
(0.000) 
0.669 
(0.008) 
190 
0.683 
Notes: (i) In parentheses p-values based on standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. (ii) Estimation method column (1): ordinary least squares, 
estimation method column (2): negative binomial. (iii) Significant variables of interest in bold.  
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Table 8: Determinants of international football performance, excluding UEFA countries 
 
Notes: (i) In parentheses p-values based on standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. (ii) Estimation method column (1): ordinary least squares, 
estimation method column (2): negative binomial. (iii) Significant variables of interest in bold. 
 
 
Variables 
Dependent  
variable 
FIFA points 
(1) 
FIFA ranking 
(2) 
Constant 
 
Migration 
 
Migration² 
 
GDP per capita 
 
(GDP per capita)² 
 
Population 
 
Population² 
 
Football history 
 
Temperature 
 
Historical performance 
 
Observations 
Adjusted R² 
 2789.128 
(0.003) 
1010.928 
(0.000) 
-449.419 
(0.162) 
5.673 
(0.081) 
-0.077 
(0.285) 
2.166 
(0.014) 
-0.008 
(0.021) 
-1.363 
(0.005) 
-0.504 
(0.007) 
39.733 
(0.000) 
144 
0.741 
-0.773 
(0.689) 
-1.813 
(0.000) 
0.447 
(0.601) 
-0.01 
(0.105) 
0.000 
(0.363) 
-0.004 
(0.034) 
0.000 
(0.102) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.136 
(0.000) 
144 
0.686 
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Table 9: Determinants of international football performance, excluding UEFA countries 
and countries with a zero migration index 
 
Variables 
Dependent  
variable 
FIFA points 
(1) 
FIFA ranking 
(2) 
Constant 
 
Migration 
 
Migration² 
 
GDP per capita 
 
(GDP per capita)² 
 
Population 
 
Population² 
 
Football history 
 
Temperature 
 
Historical performance 
 
Observations 
Adjusted R² 
 3077.582 
(0.041) 
717.978 
(0.015) 
-111.474 
(0.775) 
3.982 
(0.558) 
0.004 
(0.984) 
1.971 
(0.123) 
-0.007 
(0.11) 
-1.477 
(0.055) 
-0.652 
(0.022) 
37.656 
(0.000) 
91 
0.678 
-1.105 
(0.711) 
-1.319 
(0.039) 
-0.128 
(0.897) 
-0.007 
(0.585) 
-0.000 
(0.864) 
-0.003 
(0.197) 
0.000 
(0.265) 
0.003 
(0.043) 
0.001 
(0.017) 
-0.13 
(0.000) 
91 
0.6 
Notes: (i) In parentheses p-values based on standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. (ii) Estimation method column (1): ordinary least squares, 
estimation method column (2): negative binomial. (iii) Significant variables of interest in bold. 
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Table 10: Determinants of international football performance, including former migrants 
who returned home  
 
Variables 
Dependent  
variable 
FIFA points 
(1) 
FIFA ranking 
(2) 
Constant 
 
Migration 
 
Migration² 
 
GDP per capita 
 
(GDP per capita)² 
 
Population 
 
Population² 
 
Football history 
 
Temperature 
 
Historical performance 
 
Observations 
Adjusted R² 
 1920.257 
(0.056) 
1049.559 
(0.000) 
-551.17 
(0.027) 
6.994 
(0.028) 
-0.133 
(0.06) 
3.337 
(0.000) 
-0.01 
(0.004) 
-0.943 
(0.067) 
-0.298 
(0.107) 
28.208 
(0.000) 
190 
0.72 
1.148 
(0.601) 
-1.944 
(0.000) 
-0.716 
(0.266) 
-0.014 
(0.046) 
0.000 
(0.077) 
-0.007 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.106) 
0.002 
(0.072) 
0.001 
(0.073) 
-0.076 
(0.000) 
190 
0.701 
Notes: (i) In parentheses p-values based on standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. (ii) Estimation method column (1): ordinary least squares, 
estimation method column (2): negative binomial. (iii) Significant variables of interest in bold. 
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Table 11: Determinants of the variation in international football performance between 
1994 and 2010; restricted sample of African countries 
 Dependent  
variable 
Difference in FIFA ranking 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 
 
Difference in migration 
 
Difference in GDP per capita 
 
Difference in population 
 
Football history 
 
Observations 
Adjusted R² 
 0.034 
(0.362) 
0.275 
(0.079) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44 
0.038 
-0.018 
(0.679) 
0.311 
(0.043) 
0.015 
(0.013) 
 
 
 
 
44 
0.09 
-0.003 
(0.955) 
0.309 
(0.044) 
0.014 
(0.034) 
-0.002 
(0.364) 
 
 
44 
0.074 
-1.963 
(0.62) 
0.285 
(0.084) 
0.012 
(0.09) 
-0.001 
(0.577) 
0.001 
(0.622) 
44 
0.055 
Notes: (i) In parentheses p-values based on standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. (ii) Estimation method: ordinary least squares. (iii) 
Significant variables of interest in bold. (iv) Not all African countries are included due to data limitations regarding FIFA ranking and national 
squad compositions. (v) FIFA rankings are calculated according to formula (11) in order to account for the increase in the number of FIFA 
members between 1994 and 2010. 
 
